5/28/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly In Quizora v. Denholm Crew Management (Phils.), Inc.,[18] this Court categorically declared: [P]etitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he did so without solid proof of work-relation and work-causation or work-aggravation of his illness, the Court cannot provide him relief. [T]he disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of workrelatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have existed during the term of his employment contract. He cannot simply argue that the burden of proof belongs to respondent company. In other words, the claimant must not merely rely on the disputable presumption, but must be able to present no less than substantial evidence to support her claim. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It must reach the level of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.[19] As aptly ruled by the CA, petitioner did not present any proof of a causal connection or at least a work relation between the employment of Talosig and his colon cancer. Petitioner merely relied on presumption of causality. She failed either to establish or even to mention the risks that could have caused or, at the very least, contributed to the disease contracted by Talosig. To support her claim, petitioner simply stated that Talosig had been continuously hired by respondents from 1999 to 2005 and declared “fit to work” after the usual PEME before he contracted a disease on board the vessel.[20] Admittedly, it was the LA who “took the pain of making his own research about colon cancer.”[21] Albeit unsubstantiated, the claim for death benefits was granted. In contrast, the Court in Leonis Navigation Co. Inc. v. Villamater[22] found substantial arguments in Villamater’s pleading as early as the proceeding before the LA, where the risk factors - such as dietary provisions on board, as well as the age of the seafarer and his job were raised. On that note, we emphasize that making factual findings based only on presumptions[23] and absent the quantum of evidence required in labor cases[24] is an erroneous application of the law on compensation proceedings. This Court has ruled in Gabunas, Sr. v. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,[25] citing Government Service Insurance System v. Cuntapay,[26] that claimants in compensation proceedings must show credible information that there is probably a relation between the illness and the work. Probability, and not mere possibility, is required; otherwise, the resulting conclusion would proceed from deficient proofs.[27] Petitioner argues that respondents are now estopped from claiming that the seafarer did not contract the illness on board the vessel, as he was presumably fit by virtue of the PEME. Anent this contention, this Court has already settled that the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof that the seafarer was free from any ailment prior to his deployment.[28] The PEME is not exploratory in nature. It is not intended to be a totally in-depth and thorough examination of an applicant’s medical condition. It merely determines whether one is “fit to work” at sea or “fit for sea service”; it does not state the real state of health of an applicant.[29] Thus, we held in NYKFIL Ship Management, Inc. v. NLRC[30] as follows: While a PEME may reveal enough for the petitioner (vessel) to decide whether a seafarer is fit for overseas employment, it may not be relied upon to inform petitioners of a seafarer’s true state of health. The PEME could not have divulged respondent’s illness considering that the examinations were not exploratory. Medical bulletins show that colorectal cancer is often found after symptoms appear; most people with early colon or rectal cancer have no symptoms of the disease. [31] Accordingly, symptoms usually appear only at a more advanced stage of the disease. Thus, in this case in which Talosig was diagnosed with the most advanced stage of colon cancer, Stage IV, it cannot be conclusively said that the disease was contracted during his stint of elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/57242 4/6