special allowance for two months because Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is entitled to these awards.  Petitioners further argue that these money claims, particularly the claim for living allowance, should not be granted because they partake of the nature of earned benefits for services rendered by a seafarer.  Petitioners also contend that the balance of Rusel’s wages from August 11-22, 1996 should be applied for the payment of the costs of his repatriation, considering that under Section 19(E) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board OceanGoing Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the seafarer’s wages and other earnings.  Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of attorney’s fees should be deleted because there is nothing in the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC which states the reason why attorney’s fees are being awarded.   In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of fact which have already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA. Private respondent argues that, aside from the fact that the issues raised were already decided by three tribunals against petitioners’ favor, it is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  While there are exceptions to this rule, private respondent contends that the instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions.  Private respondent asserts that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the former is guilty of desertion.  Private respondent further contends that the right to due process is available to local and overseas workers alike, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution on labor and equal protection as well as the declared policy contained in the Labor Code.  Private respondent argues that petitioners’ act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA Contract as an alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense that private respondent was dismissed on the ground of desertion.  As to the award of attorney’s fees, private respondent contends that since petitioners’ act compelled the former to incur expenses to protect his interest and enforce his lawful claims, and because petitioners acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy private respondent’s lawful claims, it is only proper that attorney’s fees be awarded in favor of the latter.  Anent the other monetary awards, private respondent argues that these awards are all premised on the findings of the