already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional anguish to the
woman-victim and/or to their common child.
In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA
and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show that such deprivation caused
either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be
convicted of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into
consideration the variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a
crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime charged 33 the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as
the deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element of
psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein.
As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262 provides that
violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia, prision correccional. Notably,
while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided therein is
taken from the technical nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v.
People,34 the Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties
found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,35 otherwise known as the
Indetenninate Sentence Law, viz.:
Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished under a special law, the
minimum and maximum prison term of the indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond
what the special law prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the
landmark mling of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)]
that the situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law, the
penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Under such
circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties native to the Code would
also necessarily apply to the speciallaw.36
Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the penalties
under the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the
rules applied for those crimes punishable under the RPC.37
Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on Melgar the
penalty of imprisonment for an indetenninate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. In addition, Melgar is also ordered to pay a fine in the amount of
P300,000.00, to undergo a mandatory psycholo ical counselling or psychiatric
treatment, and report compliance to the court.38
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated August 28,
2015 and the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR No. 02211 finding petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "AntiViolence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar:
(a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum; (b) to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00; and (c) to