4/9/2020 E-Library - Information At Your Fingertips: Printer Friendly correctly ruled that petitioners could only be held liable under the second contract.[21] We concur with the finding that there was a novation of the first employment contract. We reiterate once more and emphasize the ruling in Reyes v. National Labor Relations Commission,[22] to wit: x x x [F]indings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. xxxx x x x Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified or reversed.(Emphasis supplied)[23] With the finding that respondent “was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with petitioners unavoidable conclusion. on the second contract”,[24] novation became an Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[25] But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.[26] In this case, there was no showing of any arbitrariness on the part of the lower courts in their findings of facts. Hence, we follow the settled rule. We need not dwell on the issue of prescription. It was settled by the Court of Appeals with its ruling that recovery of damages under the first contract was already timebarred. Thus: Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which Medequillo Jr. may initiate money claims under the 1st contract commenced on the date of his repatriation. xxx The start of the three (3) year prescriptive period must therefore be reckoned on February 1992, which by Medequillo Jr.’s own admission was the date of his repatriation to Manila. It elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocsfriendly/1/32800 6/11