Decision 5 G.R. No. 212607 First and foremost, the CA was incorrect in holding that a motion for reconsideration was an available remedy at the disposal of PDSPI in questioning NCIP RHO IV's Order dated January 14, 2013. According to NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, Series of 2003, or the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure Before the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure), the Rules of Procedure governing actions before NCIP at the time of the instant controversy, only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained before the RH0. 26 In the instant case, PDSPI had already filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 10, 2012, barring it from filing another similar motion before the NCIP RHO IV. Neither can it be validly argued that the NCIP RHO IV's Order denying due course to PDSPI' s Memorandum on Appeal should have first · been appealed before the NCIP En Banc. According to Section 97, Rule XVII of the 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, the provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply in an analogous and suppletory character. Hence, following Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which states that an appeal may be taken only from a judgment or final order that completely disposes the case, and that an appeal may not be taken from an order disallowing an appeal, the NCIP RHO IV' s Order denying due course to PDSPI's appeal cannot be subject of an appeal before the NCIP En Banc. In any case, although the general rule states that the filing of a prior motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari, such rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Jurisprudence has held that the special civil action of certiorari will lie even without a party first availing itself of a motion for reconsideration if, among other exceptions, the order challenged is a patent nullity or where the issue raised is one purely of law. 27 Moreover, while the general rule dictates that it must be first shown that all the administrative remedies prescribed by law have been exhausted before filing an extraordinary action for certiorari under the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, there are however exceptions to this rule, such as where the issue is purely a legal one or where the controverted act is patently illegal. 28 Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the issue raised by PDSPI in the instant Petition, i.e., the correct reglementary period applicable with 26 27 28 2003 NCIP Rules of Procedure, Sec. 45. Siok Ping Tang v. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., 653 Phil. 124, 136-137 (2010). Industrial Power Sales, Inc. v. Sinsuat, 243 Phil. 184, 185 (1988).