sions as the cause of some part of observed climate change.”64 This is a stark contrast to the warnings of Shell’s own scientists in 1988 that “by the time the global warming becomes detectable it could be too late to take effective countermeasures to reduce the effects or even to stabilise the situation.”65 Shell released another public-facing document in 1995 entitled Shell and the Environment.66 In it, the company acknowledged that “[t]he possibility of climate change caused by an enhanced greenhouse effect is probably the most prominent global environmental issue of today.”67 It also noted that, despite uncertainties, “Shell companies accept that there is enough indication of potential risk to the environment for governments to address the issue.”68 The following year, in 1996, a Shell Management Brief outlined the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Second Assessment Report (SAR).69 This briefing analyzed the major conclusions in the SAR, but placed heavy emphasis on uncertainties in the science and limitations in the models. Still, the brief acknowledged that “Climate change is potentially the most serious and intractable environmental issue faced by mankind. If man is changing the climate, the environmental consequences could be severe.” In 1998, Shell calculated the scale of the potential climate impact in Climate Change: What Does Shell Think and Do About It? In a remarkable chart, Shell acknowledged that the complete combustion of any single category of fossil fuel reserves would send atmospheric greenhouse concentrations soaring. A Crack in the Shell | Shell’s solution was simple: abandon coal; focus on oil and gas; and accept a doubling of atmospheric CO2.70 The “Roadmap Memo” outlined a strategy to convince the public that climate science was still unsettled. It described victory as having the “[a] verage citizens ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties in climate science.” Undergirding all of this history is the fact that the Shell Group possessed (and continues to possess) enormous scientific and technical expertise. Not only did Shell have vast resources at its disposal, it was a multinational corporation involved in dozens of other organizations and working groups. As such, Shell must be assumed to have known at least as much as was known in scientific and public discourse – and likely knew more than we are aware of even now. Shell’s history should be evaluated in the light of that expertise, and Shell should be held to the highest standard of conduct and responsibility for its decisions, communications, and behavior. Shell’s Public Image and Private Behavior Diverge Shell was on clear and early notice of climate change, yet still took actions inconsistent with a safe, climate-stable future. Moreover, despite its public acknowledgements, Shell joined industry efforts to obstruct critically needed measures to address the climate crisis. porate climate change impacts into operational planning by no later than 1989, Shell joined the Global Climate Coalition (GCC), a group of companies and industry groups which fought climate regulation, the same year.71 The GCC actively sowed misinformation about climate change and fought the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. After joining the GCC in 1989, Shell participated actively throughout the Kyoto negotiations, including through the Protocol’s adoption at the UNFCCC. Although Shell formally withdrew from the GCC in 1998, it remained an active member of the American Petroleum Institute, whose climate misinformation campaign either began or accelerated that same year. A 1998 document from the American Petroleum Institute, referred to as the “Roadmap Memo,” outlined a strategy to convince the public that climate science was still unsettled. It described victory as having the “[a] verage citizens ‘understand’ (recognize) uncertainties in climate science.”72 As part of its strategy, API funded Smithsonian scientist WeiHock Soon, who produced work contradicting the scientific consensus about climate change from 2001 to 2012. Soon failed to disclose any conflicts of interest in the funding of his work and promoted his research as independent. API’s active opposition to the Kyoto Protocol played a key role in the Bush Administration’s decision to reject the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. The following year, the administration withdrew from Kyoto, and the GCC disbanded.73 Despite the company’s confidence in the science, which drove it to incor11 | Center for International Environmental Law